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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A §78-2a-3(j). The case was 
transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment ("Board of Adjustment") has 
authority under its jurisdiction to determine the existence of nonconforming uses to review the claim 
of Stonebridge Land Holding Company ("Stonebridge") to a vested right to develop condominiums 
in the foothills south of Little Cottonwood Canyon. 
2. Whether Stonebridge could have appealed to the Board of Adjustment the zoning 
officials' refusal to act on its conditional use application to develop condominiums. 
3. Whether Stonebridge exhausted its administrative remedies before filing this action 
in the District Court when it refused to apply or appeal to the Board of Adjustment for determination 
of its vested rights claim to develop condominiums . 
4. Whether the takings claim in this suit is ripe for adjudication when Stonebridge refused 
to apply or appeal to the Board of Adjustment for determination of its vested rights claim or to apply 
to the Board of Adjustment for variances to the current zoning. 
5. Whether Stonebridge was entitled to bring an action for declaratory relief and estoppel 
when it failed to appeal the decision of the Salt Lake County Commission denying its conditional use 
application to the District Court pursuant to §17-27-1001(2). 
6. Whether the District Court correctly treated the County's motion to dismiss as a 
motion for summary judgment when the County filed an affidavit with the motion and both parties 
produced evidence in the matter. 
All issues are issues of law subject to review by the Court of Appeals for correctness. In Re 
J.D.M., 810 P.2d 494 (Ut. App. 1991). The issues have been preserved for appeal by the motion to 
dismiss, the memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, and the oral argument. R-45-81, 148-
158, 170-185,230-266. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
1. Section 19.92.030 of the Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, defining the general 
authority of the Board of Adjustment reads as follows: 
19,92.030 Powers and duties. 
The board of adjustment shall: 
A. Hear and decide appeals from the zoning decisions 
applying the zoning ordinances as provided in 19.92.050; 
B. Hear and decide the special exceptions to the terms of the 
zoning ordinance as set forth in Section 19.92.060; 
C. Hear and decide variances from the terms of the zoning 
ordinance; and 
D. Determine the existence, expansion or modification of 
nonconforming uses. 
2. Section 19.92.050. A. of the Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances defining authority 
of the Board of Adjustment to hear appeals reads as follows: 
19.92.050 Appeals. 
A. 1. The applicant or any other person or entity adversely 
affected by a zoning decision administering or interpreting a zoning 
ordinance may appeal that decision applying the zoning ordinance by 
alleging that there is error in any order, requirement, decision or 
determination made by an official in the administration or 
interpretation of the zoning ordinance. 
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3. Utah Code Ann. §17-27-704(1 )(a)(i) defining the authority of the Board of 
Adjustment to hear appeals reads as follows: 
17-27-704. Appeals. 
(1) (a) (i) The applicant or any other person or entity 
adversely affected by a decision administering or interpreting a zoning 
ordinance may appeal that decision applying the zoning ordinance by 
alleging that there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or 
determination made by an official in the administration or 
interpretation of the zoning ordinance. 
4. Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001(1) requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies reads 
as follows: 
17-27-1001. Appeals. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county's 
land use decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation 
made under authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted 
all administrative remedies. 
5. The R-1-15 zoning classification of the County zoning ordinance is attached hereto 
as Addendum A. 
6. Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001(2) providing an appeal to the district court from land 
use decisions reads as follows: 
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in 
the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for 
review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the 
local decision is rendered. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Stonebridge filed this action against County defendants in the Third District Court on 
February 3, 1995. The complaint includes four causes of action: 
1. A declaratory judgment claim to a vested right to develop condominiums on the 
foothills south of Little Cottonwood Canyon. R-9. 
2. A declaratory judgment claim to the right to develop the condominiums on the basis 
of equitable estoppel. R-13. 
3. A claim that the action of the County constituted a taking of a vested right in violation 
of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
U. S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §1983. R-18. 
4. A claim that the County zoning ordinance as applied constitutes a taking without just 
compensation. R-20. 
Salt Lake County filed a motion to dismiss the case on March 7, 1995 on the grounds 
Stonebridge failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing this action and because the 
matter was not ripe for adjudication. R-45-46. The motion was based upon the facts that 
Stonebridge did not appeal or apply to the Board of Adjustment for a determination as to whether 
it has a vested right to build the condominiums; did not apply to the Board of Adjustment for 
variances in order to develop the property; and did not appeal the decision of the Salt Lake County 
Commission to the District Court as provided in U.C.A. §10-2-1001(2). R-47-58. 
The motion to dismiss was heard on June 19, 1995 by the Honorable Anne M. Stirba, District 
Court Judge. The Court took the matter under advisement at the conclusion of oral arguments and 
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by memorandum decision dated August 10, 1995, granted summary judgment dismissing the 
complaint. The Court treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment because the 
County filed an affidavit with the motion and both parties introduced evidence for the Court to 
consider. R-192-203. Addendum B. The Court resolved an issue concerning the form of the order 
in a minute entry (R-215) and entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the County 
on December 20, 1995. R-216. Addendum C. 
Stonebridge filed this appeal on January 19, 1996. R-219-221. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. On April 10, 1980, Ken Ekstrom1 filed a conditional use application with the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission to develop a 75-unit condominium planned unit development on 29.5 
acres of property zoned Agricultural A-l located at approximately 9750 South 4000 East in the 
foothills south of Little Cottonwood Canyon. The property includes the 4.139 acres of land involved 
in this suit. The estimated time for completion of the project stated on the application was three 
years. R-72-74. 
2. On June 10, 1980, the Planning Commission gave a preliminary approval to the 
application for 66 condominium units and three single family homes. R-75. 
3. In 1984, the Salt Lake Planning Commission gave final conditional use approval for 
11 of the condominium units which have since been constructed. R-6. In 1986, a portion of the 
planned unit development was converted to a residential subdivision which was approved on 
December 22, 1986. R-7. A swimming pool and residential facility were also approved for the 
property in 1986. R-7. 
Ken Ekstrom is a prior owner of the property. R-73-74. 
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4. In 1986, Salt Lake County amended its hillside development ordinance to limit 
development to slopes having a grade of less than 30 percent. R-10. 
5. In November of 1993, Salt Lake County initiated rezoning of a large area which 
included the 4.139 acres of property from agriculture A-l to residential R-l-15. The rezoning was 
completed in May of 1994. R-72. 
6. On March 31, 1994, which was several months after the R-l-15 zoning had been 
initiated, Stonebridge filed a conditional use application with the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission for approval of 16 condominium units on the 4.139 acres. The proposed development 
does not comply with the 30 percent slope requirement or the R-l-15 zoning requirements. R-72. 
This was the first conditional use application for condominium units since the 1984 approval. R-6, 
7.2 
7. On October 25, 1994, the Salt Lake Planning Commission heard the application. At 
that meeting, counsel for Stonebridge contended that it had a vested right to the 16 condominium 
units based on the 1980 approval. The vested right was disputed by community representatives. The 
application was continued until November 8, 1994. R-78. 
8. At the November 8, 1994 meeting, the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office advised 
the Planning Commission that the Board of Adjustment, and not the Planning Commission, had 
jurisdiction to decide the nonconforming use issues and to determine whether Stonebridge has a 
vested right to continue the project based on the 1980 preliminary approval. The Planning 
2
 Other facts as to what transpired between 1980 and 1994 are in dispute between Stonebridge and certain 
Granite area residents. The Granite area residents' version of the facts are set forth in a memorandum from the law firm 
of Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee filed with the Board of County Commissioners. R-59-70. Those facts are 
relevant to the merits of the Stonebridge's vested rights claim but not to the procedural issues before the Court at this 
time. 
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Commission then denied the application on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction. R-79. The County 
Attorney's Office had previously advised counsel for Stonebridge it believed the Board of 
Adjustment, and not the Planning Commission, had jurisdiction over nonconforming use issues. 
R-178. 
9. Stonebridge appealed the Planning Commission decision to the Board of County 
Commissioners, which denied the appeal on December 7, 1994. R-10. 
10. Stonebridge has not appealed or applied to the Board of Adjustment for a 
determination as to whether it has a vested right to continue the project as a nonconforming use and 
has not applied to the Board of Adjustment for variances from the current R-1-15 zoning 
requirements. R-73. Stonebridge also did not appeal the December 7, 1994, decision of the Board 
of County Commissioners to the Third District Court pursuant to U.C.A. §17-27-1001(2). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The substantive issue in this case is whether Stonebridge now has a vested right to build 16 
condominium units on 4.139 acres of land in the foothills southeast of Salt Lake County. The 
development would be in conflict with the slope requirements of the hillside development ordinance 
enacted in 1986 and the R-1-15 zoning classification (single family dwelling) enacted in 1994. The 
claim is based upon a preliminary approval of the conditional use application given by the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission ("Planning Commission") in 1980, to a previous owner of the property, 
to build 66 condominium units on 29.5 acres of property which includes the 4.139 acres at issue. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Western Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 396 
(Utah 1980) set forth the following test for establishment of a vested right to a building permit or 
subdivision approval: 
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...[A]n applicant is entitled to a building permit or subdivision 
approval if his proposed development meets the zoning requirements 
in existence at the time of his application and if he proceeds with 
reasonable diligence absent a compelling countervailing public 
interest.... 
A debatable issue exists as to whether Stonebridge has a vested right to now develop the 
condominium based upon the 1980 preliminary approval. This is an issue which could have been 
decided at the administrative level, possibly avoiding the necessity for litigation at all. Stonebridge 
chose to have the Planning Commission decide the vested rights issue pursuant to its conditional use 
application; however, the Planning Commission does not have the authority to decide a vested rights 
claim. That authority lies with the Board of Adjustment. First, the Board of Adjustment could have 
decided the vested rights claim under its authority to determine nonconforming uses. Secondly, the 
Board of Adjustment could have decided the vested rights claim through an appeal by Stonebridge 
of the decision of the planning staff not to process the conditional use permit. This was a decision 
of a zoning official in the administration of the zoning ordinance which the Board of Adjustment has 
appellate authority to review. 
Under Utah law, a person must first exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding to 
court. Because Stonebridge refused to exhaust its administrative remedies by having the Board of 
Adjustment decide its vested rights claim, the trial court correctly dismissed Stonebridge's First and 
Second Causes of Action seeking declaratory and estoppel relief. 
The takings claims were also properly dismissed by the trial court under the doctrine of 
ripeness and finality. In order for a takings claim to be ripe for adjudication, the plaintiff must show 
that a final administrative decision has been made and there is no possibility of administrative relief. 
In this case, there is no final administrative decision. Stonebridge did not make an application to the 
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Board of Adjustment seeking a determination of its vested rights claim, nor did it apply to the Board 
for variances to the present R-l-15 zoning. 
The futility exception to the ripeness doctrine is not applicable because the Board of 
Adjustment has the authority to grant the variances which Stonebridge needs to develop a planned 
unit development condominium under the R-1 -15 zoning. The fact that Stonebridge may not obtain 
variances which would allow the specific development it now proposes does not mean the matter is 
ripe for litigation. Prior to filing a taking action, a party claiming a vested right must administratively 
pursue the claim to the vested right based upon the prior zoning and also must seek available 
variances to the current zoning even though variances cannot be granted for the exact development 
claimed as a vested right. 
Finally, Stonebridge ignored its right of appeal to the District Court under U.C.A. §17-27-
1001(2) from the decision of the Planning Commission and County Commission denying its 
conditional use on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When an appeal is specifically provided, an 
alternative form of action such as declaratory relief is not available. 
Because Stonebridge failed to pursue its right of appeal under U.C.A. §17-27-1001 and 
because it also failed to apply to the Board of Adjustment for variances to have its vested rights claim 
determined, the lower court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the County. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
STONEBRIDGE'S FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF 
ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND ESTOPPEL 
BECAUSE STONEBRIDGE FAILED TO EXHAUST ITS 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 
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Section 19.92.030 of the Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances sets forth the powers and 
duties of the Board of Adjustment That ordinance reads as follows: 
The board of adjustment shall: 
A Hear and decide appeals from the zoning decisions 
applying the zoning ordinances as provided in 19.92.050, 
B. Hear and decide the special exceptions to the terms of the 
zoning ordinance as set forth in Section 19 92.060; 
C. Hear and decide variances from the terms of the zoning 
ordinance; and 
D. Determine the existence, expansion or modification of 
nonconforming uses. 
The trial court held that Stonebridge could have applied to the Board of Adjustment under 
subsection D above claiming that it has a vested right to a nonconforming use status; it could have 
appealed to the Board of Adjustment under subsection A when the County refused to acknowledge 
its vested rights claim, and could have applied to the Board of Adjustment under subsection C for 
variances to the current R-l-15 zone. 
An analysis of the statutory powers of the Board of Adjustment shows the trial court correctly 
dismissed the first two causes of action because Stonebridge failed to exhaust its remedies by applying 
or appealing to the Board for a determination of its vested rights claim3 
A. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT HAS JURISDICTION UNDER ITS AUTHORITY 
TO DETERMINE NONCONFORMING USES TO REVIEW STONEBRIDGE'S 
VESTED RIGHTS CLAIM. 
The authority of the Board of Adjustment to grant variances is discussed in Point II of this brief 
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Stonebridge attempts to argue through the chart in its brief that a vested right and a 
nonconforming use are distinct and unrelated concepts. The treatises and many cases make it clear, 
however, that the concept of a nonconforming use includes both a claim of a vested right, based on 
an application or permit, as well as a development which is built and in use prior to a zoning change. 
This is explained in 83 AmJur.2d Planning and Zoning §635 at page 533: 
...However, not withstanding the foregoing rule, some courts have 
recognized a right of nonconforming use (or the existence of a "vested 
right") where a land owner substantially changes his position upon the 
likely issuance of a permit.... 
Anderson'^ American Law and Zoning, §620 at page 541, states that the guidelines are the 
same whether you are considering an existing use as provided in an ordinance or the concept of 
vested rights developed in the courtroom: 
...As in the case of existing uses preserved by ordinance, the nature 
and extent of use which will qualify as a nonconforming one because 
it enjoys a vested right to continue are determined case by case. The 
guidelines seem the same whether the question is one of construing 
the term "existing use" as employed in an ordinance or applying a 
courtroom developed concept of vested right. It is not uncommon for 
the two terms to be used in the same case, an existing use being 
described as a use of land which enjoys a vested right to continue 
notwithstanding its offense to the zoning regulations. 
As suggested in Anderson, courts have held that the term nonconforming use includes a 
vested rights claim based upon something less than actual use of the property. Clackamas County 
v. Holmes, 508 P.2d 190, 192 (Or. 1973). ("The allowance of a nonconforming use applies not only 
to those actually in existence but also to uses which are in various stages of development when the 
zoning ordinance is enacted.") The terms "vested right" and "nonconforming use" have often been 
used by the courts interchangeably to refer to partially completed developments and fully completed 
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developments. Petruzzi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 408 A.2d 243, 246 (Conn. 1979). ("Where a 
nonconformity exists, it is a vested right which adheres to the land itself....") Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 
389 S.W.2d 745, 753 (Mo. 1965); City of Blue Springs v. Gregory, 764 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1988). 
The Utah courts have also considered a vested rights claim based upon a development 
application to be part of the concept of a nonconforming use. lnJudkins v. Fronk, 234 P.2d 849, 850 
(Utah 1951) the Court stated as follows: 
It is appellant's contention that having obtained a valid permit 
to build a service station and in reliance thereon, expended funds and 
did work, he thereby obtained a vested right which could not be 
affected by a subsequent zoning ordinance making his proposed use 
of the building a nonconforming use.... (Emphasis added.) 
In this case, part of the original 1980 development was completed prior to the zoning 
amendments in 1986 and 1994, and part of that development has never been completed. The 
development has also gone through many application changes since the preliminary approval 16 years 
ago. Therefore, under Stonebridge's definitions, it is claiming both nonconforming uses and vested 
rights for different parts of the development. In reality, the entire issue should be considered as a 
nonconforming use issue which can be decided by the Board of Adjustment. 
B. STONEBRIDGE COULD HAVE APPEALED THE DECISION OF THE COUNTY 
ZONING OFFICIALS NOT TO ACKNOWLEDGE ITS VESTED RIGHT CLAIM TO 
THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT. 
Regardless of whether the vested rights claim fits within the authority of the Board of 
Adjustment to determine nonconforming uses under § 19.92.030.D. of the County zoning ordinance, 
Stonebridge was not left without an administrative remedy. Stonebridge in its brief claims that 
County zoning staff officials, refused to process its conditional use application to the Planning 
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Commission.4 Stonebridge could have appealed that decision to the Board of Adjustment under 
§19.92.030.A. The scope of the Board of Adjustment's appellate jurisdiction to review decisions 
"applying the zoning ordinance" is set forth in §19.92.050. A(l) of the County zoning ordinance5 
which reads as follows: 
"The appellant or any other person or entity adversely affected by a 
decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance may appeal 
that decision applying a zoning ordinance by alleging that there is 
error in any order, requirement, decision or determination made by an 
official in the administration or interpretation of the zoning 
ordinance.." (Emphasis added.) 
In 1994 zoning officials would not process Stonebridge's conditional use application because 
it was contrary to the current zoning ordinance, which in effect denied the existence of the vested 
right claim. The failure of zoning officials to process a development is a determination made by the 
zoning officials, in the administration of the zoning ordinance, which the Board of Adjustment could 
have reviewed under its appellate jurisdiction. Hatch v. Utah County Planning Department, 685 P.2d 
550 (Ut. 1984). The appeal could not be considered an appeal of a conditional use decision, since 
the Planning Commission had not considered the application at that time. 
Stonebridge argues that §19.92.050.D. of the County ordinances, which prohibits appeals to 
the Board of Adjustment that seek to waive or modify the terms of the zoning ordinance, deprives 
the board of jurisdiction to determine whether it has a vested right to develop. However, a 
determination of a vested right is not a modification or waiver of the current zoning ordinance, it is 
4
 Stonebridge brief, p. 25. 
5
 Section 19.92.050.A is nearly identical to U.C.A. § 17-27-704(1 )(a)(i), the enabling legislation for appeals to 
the Board of Adjustment. 
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the establishment of a development right prior to the existence of the current ordinance. Stonebridge 
had the right to allege that right through an appeal to the Board of Adjustment. 
C. UTAH LAW SPECIFICALLY REQUIRES THAT A PARTY EXHAUST 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE BRINGING A LAND USE ACTION IN 
THE DISTRICT COURT. 
Stonebridge chose to ignore its administrative remedies before the Board of Adjustment prior 
to proceeding to District Court. This course of action is contrary to Utah law. U.C.A. §17-27-
1001(1) enacted in 1991 provides as follows: 
1. No person may challenge in district court a county's land use 
decision made under this chapter or under regulation made under the 
authority of this chapter until they have exhausted their administrative 
remedies. 
The Utah courts have also held that judicial review of a decision resulting from the 
administration of a zoning ordinance is not permitted without a prior hearing by the Board of 
Adjustment. Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning Comm., 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 
1983); Hatch v. Utah County Planning Department, supra. Other jurisdictions have held that issues 
concerning a nonconforming use must be appealed to the Board of Adjustment prior to the affected 
party filing an action for declaratory judgment. N. G. Heimos Greenhouse, Inc. v. City of Sunset 
Hills, 597 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Schafer v. City of Pacific, 807 S.W.2d 207, 209 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Hopewell Gardens, Inc. v. Town ofEastFishfcill, 349 N.Y.S.2d 481 (NYFC 
1973); Thomas v. City of Marcos, 477 S.W.2d 322, 325-26 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). 
The two Utah cases cited above are closely in point to the facts herein. In Merrihew, the 
plaintiff filed an action seeking an extraordinary writ after the building inspector revoked his building 
permit. The Utah Supreme Court ordered that the petition be dismissed because plaintiff had not 
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appealed building officials' administrative decision to the Board of Adjustment pursuant to U.C.A. 
§17-27-16, the predecessor statute to U.C.A. §17-27-704 The Court stated the principle as follows: 
...Consequently, we reaffirm that the general proposition of law that 
parties must exhaust their administrative remedy as a prerequisite to 
seeking judicial review is applicable to the claims relating to denial of 
a permit.... 
The Hatch case is even closer in point. The plaintiff in Hatch brought an action for an 
extraordinary writ, injunctive relief and damages when the Utah County Planning Department refused 
to take action on his application for a boat launching facility by tabling it. The Supreme Court upheld 
the trial court's dismissal of the complaint because the plaintiff had failed to appeal the decision of 
the Planning Department officials to the Board of Adjustment under U.C.A. §17-27-16. 
Similarly, in this case, Stonebridge could have appealed to the Board of Adjustment from the 
zoning officials' refusal to take action on its conditional use application, requesting that the Board 
determine its vested rights claim. It could also have applied directly to the Board of Adjustment to 
have the Board determine its vested rights claim under the Board's authority to determine 
nonconforming uses. Instead, Stonebridge insisted that the vested rights claim be determined as a 
part of its conditional use permit by the Planning Commission. There is no authority under State law 
or County ordinance which allows the Planning Commission to determine a vested rights issue and 
the Planning Commission properly declined jurisdiction to do so. 
Under Stonebridge's position, neither the Planning Commission nor the Board of Adjustment 
has jurisdiction to decide the vested rights issue.6 This position would force the County or property 
Stonebridge claimed in its trial memorandum that the Planning Commission, as well as the Board of 
Adjustment lacked jurisdiction to decide the vested rights issue R-96. 
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owners into litigation every time a vested rights issue arose in conjunction with a development 
application. Such a result is not favored under the law. Contrary to Stonebridge's contention, the 
Board of Adjustment does have jurisdiction to decide a vested rights claim and, therefore, 
Stonebridge's declaratory and estoppel claims were properly dismissed by the trial court when it 
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to bringing this action. 
POINT H 
THE TAKINGS CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED 
BECAUSE STONEBRIDGE FAILED TO SATISFY THE 
DOCTRINE OF RIPENESS AND FINALITY. 
A. IN ORDER FOR A TAKINGS CLAIM TO BE RIPE FOR LITIGATION, THERE 
MUST BE A FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION CONCERNING THE LEVEL 
OF DEVELOPMENT THAT WELL BE ALLOWED ON THE PROPERTY. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that in order for a takings claim to be ripe for 
adjudication, the plaintiff must show that a final decision has been made and there is no possibility of 
administrative relief Agins v. City ofTiberron, 447 U.S. 255; 100 S. Ct. 2138; 65 L. Ed.2d 106 
(1980). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah have also held that a regulatory taking claim is not ripe for adjudication until a final decision 
regarding the application of the regulation has been made. Landmark Land Co. of Oklahoma, Inc. 
v. Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717, 722 (10th Cir. 1989); Bateman v. City of Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 708 
(10th Cir. 1996) (failure to apply to Board of Adjustment for variances and nonconforming use 
determination); Anderson v. Alpine City, 804 F. Supp. 269, 272 (Dist. Ut. 1992). 
State courts have also applied the finality and ripeness rules to takings claims under both the 
state and federal constitutions. City of El Paso v. Madero Development, 803 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex. 
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Ct. App. 1991); Hayv. CityofAndover, 436N.W.2d 800, 804-05 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Galbraith 
v. Planning Dept of City of Anderson, 627 N.E.2d 850, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). 
A case which closely parallels the facts in this case is Williamson County Regional Planning 
Comm'n. v. Hamilton, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed.2d 126 (1985). In Williamson, the 
developer obtained approval from a local planning commission of a preliminary plat for the 
development of a tract of land in accordance with the requirements of a zoning ordinance for 
clustered development. After construction of some of the units, the ordinance was changed so as to 
reduce the allowable density of the remaining units. The developer filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S. C. 
§1983 alleging that a taking had occurred without just compensation. The Supreme Court held: 
[A] claim that the application of government regulations effects a 
taking of property interest is not ripe until the government entity 
charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision 
regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue. 
473 U.S. at 186; 105 S. Ct. at 3116; 87 L. Ed.2d at 139. 
The Planning Commission had reached the decision that the plaintiff therein was not entitled 
to build under the old ordinance. The Supreme Court held that there was still not a final decision 
because the plaintiff had not sought variances from the applicability of the new ordinance. 
In this case there has been no determination by the County as to what level of development 
will be permitted on the Stonebridge property under the prior zoning classification on the basis of the 
vested rights claim or under the present zoning classification through the application for variances. 
B. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT HAS JURISDICTION TO GRANT VARIANCES 
TO THE HILLSIDE AND R-l-15 ZONING ORDINANCES. 
The Board of Adjustment is specifically empowered under state law to grant variances to the 
requirements of the county zoning ordinance. U.C.A. §17-27-703 (c). Stonebridge correctly points 
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out in its brief that the Board of Adjustment may not grant use variances; however, Stonebridge does 
not need a use variance to build a condominium planned unit development or to apply for variances 
from the slope requirements of the hillside development ordinance or the density requirements of the 
R-l-15 zoning. 
Variances are divided into two types: "use" variances and "area" variances. A use variance 
is one which permits a use not allowed under the zoning ordinance such as a commercial use in a 
residential zone, while an area variance is a modification to area, yard, density, frontage, height or 
similar restrictions. CityofMerriam v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 748 P.2d 883 (Kan. 1988); Alumni 
Control Bd v. City of Lincoln, 137 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Neb. 1965); Ivancovich v. City of Tucson 
Board of Adjustment, 529 P.2d 242 (Ariz. 1974). 
In Salt Lake County, planned unit developments are specifically allowed as a conditional use 
in the R-l-15 zoning so Stonebridge does not need a use variance for its planned unit development.7 
Condominiums are not regulated by any Salt Lake County ordinance so Stonebridge does not need 
a use variance for a condominium development in the R-l-15 zoning. A slope variance to the hillside 
development ordinance and a density variance to the R-l-15 zoning fall into the category of area 
variances which the Board of Adjustment could consider in this case. 
In order to build in the R-l-15 zoning classification, Stonebridge's development proposal 
would have to be modified to eliminate common walls for the condominium units as it would be a use 
variance to allow two family dwellings in one building in the R-l-15 zone. However, the fact that 
Stonebridge may not be able to obtain variances to build the exact development it now desires does 
A copy of the R-1 -15 zoning ordinance of Salt Lake County is reproduced in Appendix A. 
18 
not mean that the matter is ripe for litigation 8 The courts have made it clear that there has to be a 
determination as to what level of development will be allowed on the property before a takings case 
is ripe Williamson County Regional Planning Comm. v. Hamilton, 473 U S at 186, 1055 S Ct at 
3116, 87 L Ed at 139, Anderson v. Alpine City, 804 F Supp at 272-73, Seguin v. City of Sterling 
Heights, 968 F 2d 584, 587 (6th Cir 1992) For instance, in Williamson, the plaintiff could have 
obtained variances to only five of the eight objections to the plat under the new ordinance9 Still, the 
Supreme Court held there was not a final decision because the plaintiff had not sought variances from 
the applicability of the new ordinance although the developer could not have obtained all the 
variances needed to build the same development claimed as a vested right under the previous 
ordinance 
Like the plaintiflF in Williamson, Stonebridge could apply for variances to most of the current 
zoning requirements which prevent the development from being constructed Because it has not done 
so, no determination can be made as to what level of development will be allowed under the R-l-15 
zone for the Stonebridge property 
C. THE FUTILITY EXCEPTION TO THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE IS NOT 
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
Stonebridge claims that it would be futile to apply for variances and, therefore, the matter is 
ripe for litigation The futility exception to the ripeness and finality doctrine simply stated means that 
no remedies are available or that a plaintiff should not be required to pursue a futile course of action 
in order to ripen its claim The plaintiff bears a strong burden to demonstrate futility and the mere 
Stonebridge can hardly complain that even if it obtains variances, it cannot build the exact development plan 
it now proposes since this development is substantially different from the 1980 development which is the basis of the 
vested rights claim 
9
 473 U S at 188,1055 S Ct at 3117, 87 L Ed 2d at 139-140 
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allegations of futility are insufficient to support a claim. American Savings & Loan Assn. v. County 
of Marin, 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981); Landmark Land Co. of Oklahoma, Inc., 874 F.2d at 722. 
The cases cited by Stonebridge to support its claim of futility have no relevance to the facts 
of this case. Contrary to Stonebridge's representation, the case of Greenbriar Ltd. v. City of 
Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1989) was not a takings case. Rather, it was a due process case 
challenging the denial of a rezoning application. The Court held that since variances changing a 
zoning classification were not permissible, the rezoning decision was a final decision. In each of the 
Ninth Circuit cases cited by plaintiff, Hoene v. County of San Bonito, 870 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1989) 
and Harrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1988), the developer had applied to the 
local government for a subdivision approval under the existing ordinance which permitted the 
development. The local government denied the development and then changed the zoning ordinance 
to prohibit development. Variances to the zoning ordinance were not allowed under the applicable 
law. The court in each case held the case was ripe for adjudication since the subdivision was 
conclusively rejected by the local government on the merits and variances were not a legal option. 
Likewise, the other cases cited by Stonebridge concerning the futility issue, including the case 
ofHatton-Wardv. Salt Lake City Corp., 828 P.2d 1071 (Ut. App. 1992), either involved situations 
where the local government had decided the issue or where the administrative body was not 
empowered to decide the issue. Here, the facts are just the opposite. The County Planning 
Commission has not denied Stonebridge's right to develop; rather, it has only decided it does not 
have jurisdiction to decide the vested rights issue after having granted a preliminary approval to the 
development some 16 years ago. The Board of Adjustment has jurisdiction to decide Stonebridge's 
claim to a vested right and to grant variances to the present ordinance. It is not a case where a 
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remedy does not exist; rather, it is a case where the developer has refused to pursue the appropriate 
remedy. 
Stonebridge argues the rezoning of the property by the County Commission means the 
County has already decided the nonconforming use and variance issues. The argument has no merit 
since the purpose of the Board of Adjustment is to consider variances, appeals, and nonconforming 
use issues. Because the County Commission has rezoned the area does not dictate the results of an 
application to the Board of Adjustment for variances or for a determination concerning the vested 
right. Despite Stonebridge's claims to the contrary, the facts are clear that there has been no final 
administrative determination as to what level of development will be allowed on the Stonebridge 
property and therefore the matter is not ripe for litigation. 
POINT m 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE CASE 
BECAUSE STONEBRIDGE FAILED TO APPEAL THE 
DECISION OF THE COUNTY COMMISSION TO THE 
DISTRICT COURT AS PROVIDED IN U.C.A. §17-27-1001. 
An appeal is specifically provided for by statute from conditional use and other zoning 
decisions by counties. Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001(2) reads as follows: 
17-27-1001. Appeals. 
* * * 
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in 
the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for 
review of this decision with the district court within 30 days after the 
local decision is rendered. 
Under the above statute Stonebridge had 30 days from the County Commission decision of 
December 7, 1994, to file a petition appealing that decision. The complaint was not filed until 
February 10, 1995, 65 days after the County Commission decision. Failure to file a timely appeal is 
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jurisdictional. Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980); Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 
1982) 
Stonebridge cannot avoid the 30 day statutory appeal period by filing a declaratory judgment 
action. When an appeal is specifically provided for by statute, an alternative form of action is not 
available Crist v. Maple ton City, 497 P. 2d 633 (Utah 1972) (mandamus not substitute for an 
appeal); Punohu v. Sunn, 666 P.2d 1133 (Ha. 1983) (declaratory judgment action not substitute for 
an appeal); V-l Oil Co. v. County of Bannock, 554 P.2d 1304 (Id. 1976) (declaratory judgment not 
substitute for appeal) Otherwise, a person neglecting to file a timely appeal could avoid the statutory 
time period by calling the appeal a declaratory judgment action. 
Stonebridge attempts to avoid the requirements of Section 17-27-1001(2) by arguing in its 
brief that this is not an appeal of the conditional use decision because the Planning Commission and 
County Commission never reached the merits of the case.10 The fact that an administrative body 
makes its decision on the basis of jurisdiction does not foreclose that decision from being reviewed 
by the district court through the appellate process provided for in U.C.A. §17-27-1001(2). 
However, assuming arguendo that Stonebridge's argument is correct, Stonebridge still had 
an administrative remedy it should have pursued. This Court has held that decisions of the Board of 
County Commissioners are decisions of an "administrative official" for purposes of an appeal to the 
Board of Adjustment under U.C.A. §17-27-704. Bennion v. Sundance Development Corp., 897 P.2d 
1232 (Utah App. 1995). Thus, if this case is not viewed as a review of a conditional use decision, 
Stonebridge argues both sides of the issue On pages 18 and 19 of its brief, Stonebridge argues it could not 
have appealed the decision of the County Commission denying jurisdiction to decide the vested rights issue to the Board 
of Adjustment because the appeal would have been an appeal of a conditional use decision which the Board of 
Adjustment is prohibited from hearing. On page 21 of the brief, Stonebridge argues the opposite position - that this is 
not an appeal because the Planning Commission and County Commission never reached the merits of the application 
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Stonebridge should have appealed the decision of the County Commission denying jurisdiction to 
consider Stonebridge's vested rights claim to the Board of Adjustment under 19.92.030 of the County 
zoning ordinance. However, if it is viewed as a conditional use decision, as the County contends, the 
decision should have been appealed to the District Court under U.C.A. § 17-27-1001(2). Either way, 
Stonebridge had an appropriate remedy it failed to follow prior to bringing this action and, therefore, 
the trial court correctly dismissed the case. Because the Court considered matters outside the 
pleading, the motion to dismiss was properly treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 
56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Salt Lake County 
defendants because Stonebridge failed to have the Board of Adjustment determine its vested rights 
claim prior to proceeding with this action and failed to appeal the decision of the Board of County 
Commissioners declining to determine the vested rights claim to the District Court under U.C.A. 
§17-27-1001(2). For the reasons stated in this brief, Salt Lake County asks that the decision of the 
District Court be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this / 6 day of January, 1997. 
DOUGLAS R SHORT 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By r^-T-v- 1&*><*^ 
KENT S. LEWIS 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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ADDENDUM A 
19.26.010 
Chapter 19-26 
R-l-15 RESIDENTIAL ZONE 
Sections: 
19.26.010 
19.26.020 
19.26.030 
19.26.040 
19.26.045 
19.26.050 
19.26.060 
19.26.070 
19.26.080 
Purpose of provisions-
Permitted uses. 
Conditional uses. 
Lot area-
Lot width. 
Front yard. 
Side yard. 
Rear yard. 
Building height 
19.26.010 Purpose of provisions. 
The purpose of the R-l-15 zone is to provide 
neighborhoods in the county for single-family resi-
dential development (Prior code § 22-12A-1) 
19.26.020 Permitted uses. 
Permitted uses in the R-l-15 zone include: 
— Accessory uses and buildings customarily 
incidental to permitted uses; 
— Agriculture; 
— Home day care/preschool, subject to Section 
19.04.293; 
— Household pets; 
— Single-family dwelling. (Ord. 1179 § 5 (part), 
1992; § 1 (part) of Ord. passed 2/1/84; prior code 
§ 22-12A-2) 
19.26.030 Conditional uses. 
Conditional uses in the R-l-15 zone include: 
— Day care/preschool center, subject to Section 
19.76.260; 
— Home day care/preschool, subject to Section 
19.04.293; 
— Home occupation; 
— Nursery and greenhouse, provided that there 
is no retail shop operated in connection therewith; 
— Pigeons, subject to city-county health depart-
ment regulations; 
— Planned unit development; 
— Private educational institutions having an 
academic curriculum similar to that ordinarily given 
in public schools; 
— Private nonprofit recreational grounds and 
facilities; 
— Public and quasi-public uses; 
— Residential facility for elderly persons; 
— Residential health care facility for up to five 
residents excluding the facility operator and his/her 
related family with a maximum of one nonresident 
part-time relief employee on the premises at any one 
time, which use shall not change the residential 
appearance and character of the property; 
— Sportsman's kennel (minimum lot area one 
acre); 
— Temporary buildings for uses incidental to 
construction work, which buildings must be re-
moved upon the completion or abandonment of the 
construction work. If such buildings are not re-
moved within ninety days upon completion of con-
struction work and thirty days after notice, the 
buildings will be removed by the county at the 
expense of the owner. (Ord. 1200 § 4 (part), 1992; 
Ord. 1179 § 6 (part), 1992; Ord. 1118 § 5 (part), 
1990; (part) of Ord. passed 12/15/82; prior code § 
22-12A-3) 
19.26.040 Lot area. 
The minimum lot area in the R-l-15 zone shall 
be not less than fifteen thousand square feet. (Prior 
code § 22-12A-4) 
19.26.045 Lot width. 
The minimum width of any lot in the R-l-15 
zone shall be eighty feet, at a distance thirty feet 
back from the front lot line. (Ord. 1056 § 3, 1989) 
19.26.050 Front yard. 
In the R-l-15 zone, the minimum depth of the 
front yard for main buildings, and for private garag-
es which have a minimum side yard of ten feet shall 
be thirty feet All accessory buildings, other than 
private garages, which have a side yard of at least 
ten feet, shall be located at least six feet in the rear 
of the main building. (Prior code § 22-12A-7) 
(S*k Lake Cooacy S-93) 596 
19-26-060 Side yard 
In the R-l-15 zone, the minimum side yard for 
any dwelling shall be ten feet, and the total width 
of the two required side yards shall be not less than 
twenty-four feet Other main buildings shall have a 
minimum side yard of twenty feet, and the total 
width of the two required side yards shall be not 
less than forty feet The minimum side yard for a 
private garage shall be ten feet except that private 
garages and other accessory buildings located in the 
rear and at least six feet away from the main build-
ing may have a minimum side yard of one foot 
provided that no private garage or other accessory 
building shall be located closer than ten feet to a 
dwelling on an adjacent lot On corner lots, the side 
yard which feces on a street for both main and 
accessory buildings shall be not less than twenty 
feet (Prior code § 22-12A-5) 
19-26-070 Rear yard. 
In R-l-15 zones, the minimum depth of the rear 
yard for any main building shall be thirty feet and 
for accessory buildings one foot; provided that on 
corner lots which rear upon the side yard of another 
lot accessory buildings shall be located not closer 
than ten feet to such side yard. (Prior code § 
22-12A-8) 
19-26-080 Building height 
A. Except as otherwise specifically provided in 
this tide, no building or structure shall exceed the 
following height 
1. Thirty feet on property where the slope of the 
original ground surface exceeds fifteen percent or 
the property is located in the hillside protection 
zone. The slope shall be determined using a line 
drawn from the highest point of elevation to the 
lowest point of elevation on the perimeter of a box 
which encircles the foundation line of the building 
or structure. The box shall extend for a distance of 
fifteen feet or to the property line, whichever is less, 
around the foundation line of the building or struc-
ture. The elevation shall be determined using a 
certified topographic survey with a maximum con-
tour interval of two feet; 
19.26.O0U 
2. Thirty-five feet on other properties; 
B. No dwelling structure shall contain less than 
one story- (Ord. 1237 § 3, 1993) 
(Salt Ufce Coonty ft-93) 
ADDENDUM B 
By 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ST0NEBRID6E LAND HOLDING 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of the 
State of Utah; THE BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY; RANDY HORIUCHI; 
MARY CALLAHAN; BRENT OVERS ON; 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING 
COMMISSION; JOHN DOES 1-10; 
Defendants• 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 950900959 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
defendants'1 "Motion to Dismiss11 plaintiff's2 Complaint. Plaintiff 
opposed this motion. On June 19, 1995, the parties, through their 
respective counsel, Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Kevin Egan Anderson 
in behalf of plaintiff, and Kent S. Lewis, Deputy County Attorney, 
in behalf of defendants, presented oral argument to the Court. At 
defendants in this matter are Salt Lake County, the Board of 
County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, Randy Horiuchi, Mary 
Callahan, Brent Overson, Salt Lake County Planning Commission and 
John Does 1-10. Collectively they are referred to as "defendants.11 
2Plaintiff is Stonebridge Land Holding Company and is hereafter 
referred to as "plaintiff" or "Stonebridge." 
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STONEBRIDGE V. S.L. COUNTY PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under 
advisement. 
The Court has now carefully considered the Motion, Memoranda 
and Affidavit and other documents submitted by the parties, and the 
arguments of counsel* Based on the foregoing, and for good cause 
shown, the Court hereby enters the following ruling. 
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds 
it fails to state a cause upon which relief can be granted and that 
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. More 
particularly, defendants contend that plaintiff failed to exhaust 
its administrative remedies and that the matter is not ripe for 
adjudication. Defendants further contend that the Planning 
Commission properly refused to consider Stonebridge's conditional 
use application on the grounds that (1) the Board of Adjustments 
and not the Salt Lake County Planning Commission had authority to 
decide the vested rights issue; (2) Stonebridge failed to exhaust 
its administrative remedies by refusing to request the Board of 
Adjustments to consider its claims; and (3) Stonebridge's 
constitutional taking claim is not ripe for adjudication because 
Stonebridge has not secured a final decision from Salt Lake County 
as to what it will be allowed to construct. 
STONEBRIDGE V. S.L. COUNTY PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This Motion was filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. The standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion is that it must be "apparent that under no set of facts 
proven in support of the claim as pleaded would [Stonebridge] be 
entitled to relief." Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olsen, Inc.. 815 P.2d 
1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991). 
In this case, defendants submitted an affidavit in support of 
their Motion, and both parties produced other evidence for the 
Court to consider. Accordingly, this Motion may be treated as a 
Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. The standard for summary 
judgment is that there may be no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The non-moving party is 
entitled to all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 
evidence presented to the Court.3 
The central issue in this case revolves around who, among the 
defendants, if anyone, has the authority to determine whether a 
particular interest claimed constitutes a "vested right" and 
whether a "vested right" should be considered the same as or at 
Notwithstanding the fact defendants submitted the Affidavit 
and both parties produced other evidence to the Court, the parties 
have approached this motion as a motion to dismiss and not as a 
motion for summary judgment. 
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least comparable to a non-conforming use. The material facts in 
this case are not in dispute, they are set forth fully in the 
pleadings. 
I. 
Pursuant to Section 19.92.030 of the Salt Lake County Code of 
Ordinances, 1986, the Board of Adjustment has the power to 
A. Hear and decide appeals from zoning decisions 
applying the zoning ordinances as provided in Section 
19.92.050; 
B. Hear and decide the special exceptions to the terms 
of the zoning ordinances set forth in Section 19.92.060; 
C. Hear and decide variances from the terms of the 
zoning ordinance; and 
D. Determine the existence, expansion or modification 
of nonconforming use. 
Under Section 19.92.030 plaintiff could have (1) appealed to 
the Board of Adjustment under subsection A when the Development 
Services Division refused to acknowledge plaintiff's vested rights 
claim; (2) applied to the Board of Adjustment under subsection C 
for variances to the current R-l-15 zoning; or (3) applied to the 
Board of Adjustment under subsection D claiming it has a vested 
right to nonconforming use status. 
Instead of pursuing its claim before the Board of Adjustment, 
plaintiff proceeded to file its Complaint in district court. 
Pursuant to Section 17-27-1001(1) Utah Code Ann. (1991) , ,f[n]o 
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person may challenge in district court a county's land use 
decisions made under this chapter or under regulation made under 
authority of this chapter until they have exhausted their 
administrative remedies." 
Plaintiff claims that the Board of Adjustment does not have 
jurisdiction to consider its claim because plaintiff's claim 
concerns a claimed vested right as opposed to a nonconforming use 
and that no ordinance or other law authorizes the Board of 
Adjustment to determine the existence of "vested rights." 
Howeverf Section 19.92.030 clearly authorizes the Board, among 
other things, to determine the existence of "nonconforming uses." 
The concepts of "vested rights" and "nonconforming uses" have been 
used interchangeably in other jurisdictions to refer to partially 
completed developments as well as fully completed developments. 
Petrazzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, etc., 408 A.2d 243, 246 (Conn. 
1979); Clackamas County v. Holmes. 508 P.2d 190 (Ore. 1973)4. 
Based on the foregoing and the other arguments set forth by 
defendants, because plaintiff failed to have the Board of 
Adjustment decide plaintiff's issues, plaintiff's first and second 
causes of action are dismissed. 
4See, also, the discussion regarding vested 
rights/nonconforming uses in Section II and other arguments set 
forth by defendants. 
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II. 
Plaintiff presented its cause to the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission and the Salt Lake County Commission notwithstanding 
their determination that plaintiff should proceed before the Board 
of Adjustments. As such, plaintiff ignored its requirement to 
exhaust its administrative remedies and then ignored its obligation 
to comply with Section 17-27-1001 Utah Code Ann. (1991)
 #
5
 which 
requires a petition for review of the decision below be filed 
timely with the district court; namely: within 30 days after the 
local decision is rendered6. 
In this case plaintiff had 30 days from the County 
Commission's December 7, 1994, decision to file a petition 
appealing the decision with the district court. However, the 
Complaint was not filed until February 10, 1995, some 65 days after 
the County Commission decision. 
5Section 17-27-1001(2) provides as follows: 
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the 
exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a 
petition for review of this decision with the district 
court within 30 days after the local decision is 
rendered. 
Plaintiff argues that it did not have to appear before either 
the Planning Commission nor the Zoning Commission. However, this 
position is not persuasive. As a matter of law, plaintiff was 
required to exhaust its applicable administrative remedies, supra. 
ti f: ft 'A & ^ 
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Failure to file a timely appeal is jurisdictional. Burgers v. 
Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Peav v. Peay. 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 
1980)• 
Moreover, pursuant to Section 17-27-1001(3), an appeal to the 
district court is limited as follows to 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are 
valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the [administrative] 
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
The limitations on the court's review of the administrative 
decision before set forth in Section 17-27-1001(3) underscore the 
importance and necessity of developing a factual record through the 
administrative review process. 
Stonebridge's argument that Mvested rights" issues must be 
decided exclusively by the courts because they concern issues of 
law is meritless. Issues regarding vested rights/nonconforming 
uses involve determinations both of fact and law. The clear 
administrative scheme of the current statutes is to require the 
development of the factual record in the administrative context. 
In this process, legal issues are addressed. There is nothing 
unique about "vested rights" as compared to "nonconforming uses" so 
far as the necessity of developing the factual record is concerned. 
00019* 
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Similarly, Stonebridge may not ask for a declaratory judgment 
when Utah law expressly provides for an appeal of the County 
Commissioners' decision to the Court. Otherwise, as Salt Lake 
County notes, a party who failed to file a timely appeal could 
avoid the 30-day requirement simply by asking for declaratory 
judgment. Therefore, Stonebridge's first two causes of action for 
declaratory judgment and estoppel are not properly before the 
Court. 
Both parties rely on Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283 
(Utah App. 1994), to support their respective positions. In 
Stucker, the plaintiff filed an action seeking declaratory judgment 
relief, writ of mandamus relief and damages resulting from an 
alleged unconstitutional, inverse taking of plaintiff's property. 
However, plaintiff's reliance on Stucker in this case is misplaced 
because it was filed prior to the enactment of Section 17-27-703 
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1992), which grants enabling authority for 
boards of adjustment to decide nonconforming uses. 
Stucker was also decided prior to the enactment of Section 17-
27-1001 which provides for an appeal to the district court from 
planning and county commission land use decisions. The prior code 
did not contain similar provisions. 
fi fl 11 r Q >Q 
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Thus, Stucker, like all of the Utah cases on which plaintiff 
relies concerning vested rights issues, occurred prior to the 
enactment of this legislation. At the times in which these cases 
were filed, boards of adjustment had no authority to determine 
nonconforming use issues and there was no appeal process to the 
district court from planning and county commission land use 
decisions. Declaratory and Rule 65B actions were the only remedies 
available to review land use issues. Based on the legislation 
having become effective in 1991 and 1992 as discussed above, 
parties now seeking determinations concerning nonconforming 
use/vested rights issues must comply with the relevant appeal 
process and time requirements. 
III. 
Finally, Stonebridge may not maintain its takings claim for 
compensation under the United States or Utah Constitutions because 
Stonebridge has not secured a final decision from Salt Lake County 
as to what it will be allowed to construct. 
In this case, as previously discussed, plaintiff should have 
applied to the Board of Adjustments to have the vested rights issue 
determined and, if necessary, applied for variances to the R-l-15 
zoning. Since 1992, Section 17-27-703(2) (Supp. 1992) has enabled 
0 fl A °> n A 
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cities and counties to delegate to their respective boards of 
adjustment the authority to decide nonconforming use issues. Prior 
to 1992, boards of adjustment had no such power. The cases on 
which plaintiff relies to support its contentions regarding 
ripeness and finality arose prior to the 1992 amendments and do not 
involve exhaustion of remedies or ripeness issues. 
Moreover, the Court is not persuaded that it would be futile 
for plaintiff to seek administrative remedies as discussed, supra. 
Here, the County Planning Commission has not denied Stonebridge the 
right to develop. Rather, approximately 15 years ago, it granted 
preliminary approval to the development. The Board of Adjustment 
has not denied plaintiff's claim to a vested right nor denied 
variances to the present ordinance. This is not a case in which a 
remedy does not exist. To the contrary, this is a case in which 
the developer has refused to pursue its remedy. 
Based on the foregoing, and the other arguments set forth by 
defendants, defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in its 
entirety. 
& fj i\ <> f \ 'i 
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Counsel for defendants is ordered to prepare a proposed Order 
consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this \€>^Ldav of August, 1995. 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
r. r. A Ck f. G\ 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this (D day of 
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Robert S. Campbell, Jr, 
Kevin Egan Anderson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Deputy County Attorney 
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ADDENDUM C 
w o iMsrnn COURT 
ThirH J f H W o l r j f s t r f c t 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ST0NEBRID6E LAND HOLDING : ORDER 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. 950900959 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body : 
corporate and politic of the 
State of Utah; THE BOARD OF : 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY; RANDY HORIUCHI; : 
MARY CALLAHAN; BRENT OVERSON; 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING : 
COMMISSION; JOHN DOES 1-10; 
Defendants• 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim 
under which relief may be granted and for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction came before the Court for hearing on June 19, 1995 at 
9:00 a.m., the Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding; Kevin Egan 
Anderson appeared on behalf of plaintiff, Kent Lewis appeared on 
behalf of defendants. The motion was based upon the contention 
that plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies that 
the matter was not ripe for decision. The Court treated the motion 
as a motion for summary judgment because an affidavit was filed by 
defendants and other documents were presented to the Court by both 
parties. The Court having considered the pleadings, Memoranda, and 
A f\ ft -'i * <* 
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documents filed by the parties and having rendered a Memorandum 
decision granting defendants' motion and stating the grounds for 
such decision, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 
1. Summary Judgment is granted in favor of defendants, 
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint. 
2. The parties shall each bear their own costs and 
attorney's fees. 
Dated this £C> —day of December, 1995. 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE "*^ s 
a r. i\ *• * n 
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